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Gödel’s explicit thesis was that his undecidable formula GUS is a well-formed, well-
defined proposition in any formalisation of Intuitive Arithmetic IA in which the Axioms 
and Rules of Inference are recursively definable. His implicit thesis was that GUS is not 
formally inconsistent in any such system. 
I consider a constructive, and intuitionistically unobjectionable, formalisation PP of IA 
in which the Axioms and Rules of Inference are recursively definable. I argue that, 
although Gödel’s proposition GUS is a well-formed formula in PP, it is an ill-defined 
proposition that formally reflects the “Liar” paradox in PP. 
I argue that the introduction of “formal truth” and “PP-provability” values to selected 
propositions of IA through PP leads to the collapse of the Gödelian argument advanced 
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Author’s preface 
Intuitive truth - a paradigm shift 
The alternative consequences of Godel’s reasoning developed in this paper (and in its 
roots) involve a significant paradigm shift in the philosophical basis of our perception of 
the nature of Intuitive Knowledge, and more particularly of the concept of factual, or 
intuitive truth.  
By Intuitive Knowledge I refer loosely to that body of pro-active knowledge that stems 
directly from our conscious states, in contrast to our reactive Instinctive Knowledge, 
which stems from, and lies within, our sub-conscious and unconscious states. 
This preface is intended to highlight the wider significance of an issue that may otherwise 
lie in obscurity due to the specialised nature of the subject. My thesis is that the influence, 
on our current modes of thought, of the interpretations, and conclusions, drawn from 
Gödel’s original paper (Gödel 1931) may have a wider, multi-disciplinary, element that is 
not obvious from an appreciation of its purely logical and mathematical import. 
Implicit influence of Gödel’s Platonism 
I argue that the roots of this influence may be traced to implicitly Platonistic elements 
that underlie classical first order predicate calculus PA, which is based essentially on the 
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formal system defined by Gödel in his (1931) paper. Loosely speaking Gödel, who was 
an explicitly strong Platonist, assumed the existence of a world of ideals that could 
objectively be referred to for arbitrating which of our assumptions or premises, when 
formally expressed in a rigorously constructed scientific language, were “intuitively 
true”, and which were “intuitively false”, under interpretation. 
Now one may, of course, argue reasonably - as Gödel does - in Platonistic terms and 
define "intuitive truths" as characteristics of "relationships" that are assumed to "exist" in 
some "absolute" sense (that is, even in the absence of any "perceiver") between the 
"objects" of an external "ontology" (both of which are also taken to "exist" in some 
"absolute" sense).  
I argue, however, for an alternative view of "relationships" as belonging to "perceptions" 
that we consciously “construct” and selectively “assign” to abstract "objects" (that 
themselves are conceptual "constructs") of an abstract "ontology" (that is similarly a 
conceptual "construct").  
In other words, I argue that each "perception" can reasonably be assumed to be an 
abstract “construct" based on a unique, one-of-a-kind, never-to-be-repeated 
consciousness of an “experience”. "Intuitive truth" is then, essentially, a “constructed”, 
space-time-localised, “factual truth”. It corresponds to a "subjectively” constructed 
characteristic of the “expression” of individually constructed "perceptions". Loosely 
speaking, it corresponds to a characteristic of the way we construct an “expression” for 
that which we select as common to a series of "subjective perceptions", rather than to a 
characteristic that we “discover” of an "objectively" observed "something". 
My brief against Platonism, when rooted in scientific ways of thought, is that it could 
permit us to “logically” validate our subjective “intuitive” perceptions as being reflective 
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of some “absolute Truth” that “must be” of universal “significance” in a Utopian, 
Platonistic world. 
Gödel's Theorems and "formal (logical) truth" 
The view of Gödel's Theorems that I attempt to present is that they are essentially 
concerned with the effectiveness of our ability to “communicate” the abstractions that we 
intellectually "construct" on the basis of our “individualistic” sensory perceptions. They 
thus have to do with the efficiency and effectiveness of our language of communication, 
and involve the concept of “logical truth”, or "formal truth" (the two terms are used 
synonymously in this paper). 
I argue that, in formal languages, a selected set of "axiomatic truths" is expressed as a set 
of Axioms (or Axiom schemas). The selection criteria is that the Axioms are readily 
accepted by any "perceiver" as faithfully reflecting some "significant" "factual truths" 
pertaining to the expression of abstract "constructed" elements of the "constructed" 
ontology under consideration as “perceived” and “conceived” also by the “perceiver”. 
For the most basic, and intuitive, of our scientific languages, namely Number Theory or 
our Intuitive Arithmetic of the natural numbers, I take the commonly accepted selection 
of such "axiomatic truths" as the set of Peano's Postulates, first expressed in semi-
axiomatic format by Dedekind (1901). 
I consider that the challenge in any such theory is then to find a suitable set of Rules of 
Inference by which we can assign unique "formal (logical) truth" values to as many well-
formed propositions of the theory as possible that are not Axioms.  
I argue that the concept of "formal (logical) truths" is thus merely the result of the 
application of a set of Rules of Inference for assigning such “formal (logical) truth” 
values to various “logical” permutations and combinations of "axiomatic truths" as (finite 
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and infinite) compound assertions (which ideally should not introduce any new 
"axiomatic truths" that are not already implicit within the Axioms). 
I argue that the Rules of Inference of any specific language should include not only the 
familiar “Rules of Inference” that we define for the language, but also the logical Axioms 
that, strictly speaking, should be considered equally as being part of the Rules of 
Inference of the language. 
Significance 
I argue that he significance of "formal (logical) truths" lies in our experience that the 
"factual (intuitive) truths" of our "perceptions" can generally be corresponded in a 
communicable language with a high degree of correlation to the "formal (logical) truths" 
of the language. The large body of our “factual (intuitive) truths” may thus also be 
viewed as “intuitively constructed” permutations and combinations of a smaller, ideally 
finite, set of "factual (intuitive) truths". 
This appears to suggest that the "significance" to us (and possibly to any intelligence 
whose evolution is based on communication) of any set of "factual (intuitive) truths" may 
be proportional to the body of "formal (logical) truths" that can be inferred by various 
“logical” combinations and permutations of the "axiomatic truths" that can be distilled 
from the particular set of “factual (intuitive) truths”. 
I argue that the significance of Gödel's Theorems lies in the fact that they are derived in a 
system of Axioms where the Rules of Inference lead to a particularly rich body of 
expressions that can be assigned "formal (logical) truth” values under various 
interpretations of the symbols of the theory. 
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Non-verifiable assertions implicit in Gödel’s formal system  
I argue, however, that a major feature of Gödel’s formal system is that the chosen Rules 
of Inference are non-constructive, in the sense that they also assign, implicitly and 
sweepingly, non-verifiable "formal (logical) truth” values under interpretation in some 
models to various expressions. Thus the system, in a sense, postulates "formally 
(logically) true" expressions under some interpretation that cannot be correlated, even in 
principle, to any "factual (intuitive) truths" of a human "perception". 
In (Anand 2001), I highlight this non-intuitive aspect of Gödel's choice of Rules of 
Inference, and suggest more intuitive, constructive, Rules of Inference that would make 
our formal systems of Arithmetic more faithfully representative of our Intuitive 
Arithmetic. 
One of the consequences of using constructive Rules of Inference is that the reasoning by 
which Godel concludes that the formal “Gödel” proposition, which translates loosely as 
“The ‘Gödel’ proposition is not ‘provable’”, is intuitively true collapses. In this paper, I 
define a formalisation of Intuitive Arithmetic in which Gödel’s argument leads to a 
contradiction. In effect, we are faced with the expected reflection of the "Liar" sentence, 
namely "The 'Liar' sentence is a lie", in constructive formal theories.  
However, I argue that this is not necessarily the drawback that it appears to be at first 
sight. In fact such contradictions both encourage and discipline us in our use of rich and 
creative languages. They force us to focus on devising rules by which we can recognise 
well-formed formulas of the theory that need to be treated as ill-defined propositions (in 
the sense that there is no way a unique "formal (logical) truth" value can be assigned to 
the well-formed formula by the Rules of Inference of the theory). I thus offer the thesis 
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that “consistency” may be treated in any theory as the specification for determining 
which well-formed formulas qualify as well-defined propositions.  
An illusion 
I argue that, in a sense, what Gödel’s reasoning actually accomplishes is best viewed as 
an “illusion”, where a "constructive" argument successfully masks a "non-constructive" 
premise. 
The significance of this is that if an “illusion-prone” logical system forms the bedrock of 
all scientific thought and discourse, then attendant conflicts and controversies must 
inevitably follow "illusory", if not outright "hallucinatory", "perceptions" rooted in non-
constructive thought. 
To the extent that the foundations of our scientific thought can visibly be seen to be 
increasingly influencing, and impacting on, the way we "perceive", "conceive", 
"express", "communicate" and "act" in every sphere of human activity, any logic that 
provides a theoretical legitimacy to "illusory perceptions" as having a possible validity in 
a non-verifiable universe that "exists" in some "absolute" sense can be held qualitatively 
accountable in some measure for reinforcing the kind of "perception" that leads to 
unresolvable confrontations arising out of "extra-logical" consequences of non-
constructive theories. 
(The development of systems of Artificial Intelligence, which so far have not shown any 
marked susceptibility to Gödelian "illusions", may, however, force consideration of 
formal systems that are more self-disciplined in their faithfulness to our intuitively 
constructive aspects that can be verified and duplicated mechanically.) 
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To sum up 
In this paper I aim to highlight the implicit assumptions that, I argue, underlie the formal 
structure of our current formal system of logic. 
Truth: I argue, albeit implicitly, against the concept of “intuitive truth” as something a 
priori that is to be discovered, and which can be captured only partially through formal 
structures. In other words, I argue against the concept that “provable” formulas in any 
formal system can be corresponded 1-1 to a proper subset of the “intuitively true” 
propositions under any “interpretation” of the formal system. 
Formal truth: My thesis is that “formal (logical) truth” is a characteristic that we choose 
to attribute, as something of commonly communicable, intellectual, “significance”, to our 
assertions through meta-rules of assignment that we call our logical Rules of Inference 
(by definition, these lie outside the language). 
Significance: I hold we choose these rules in order to intellectually communicate the 
essence of “factual (intuitive) truths” that we also choose to intuitively construct as 
“significant”, individualistic, abstract concepts. 
Factual truth: I hold that “factual truths”, or “intuitive truths”, belong to our consciously 
constructed intuitive “perceptions”, just as “formal (logical) truth” belongs to our 
consciously constructed intellectual systems (languages) of communication. 
Consciousness: I hold that “factual (intuitive) truth” does not “exist” outside 
“consciousness”. Thus there is no “factual (intuitive) truth” in the absence of conscious 
intuitive “perception”, just as there is no “formal (logical) truth” in the absence of 
conscious intellectual “communication”. 
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Axiomatic truth: I hold that “axiomatic truths” are “factual (intuitive) truths” that we 
choose to express within a language of communication in order to create a common link 
between the body of our intuitively constructed “factual (intuitive) truths”, and the body 
of our intellectually constructed “formal (logical) truths”.  
Rules of Inference: I hold that our Rules of Inference and Logical Axioms are what we 
select as the means of intellectually constructing the body of our “formal (logical) 
truths”, just as our Intuition is what we rely on for intuitively constructing the body of our 
“factual (intuitive) truths”. 
Inductive truth: I further hold that “inductive (extra-logical) truth” is, loosely speaking, 
an individualistic, non-experiential, non-verifiable, extrapolation of “formal (logical) 
truth” - built around both qualified, and individually preferred, generalisations of “formal 
(logical) truth”. 
Interpretation: I argue against the thesis that a formal system can be meaningfully viewed 
in isolation, separately from an intended interpretation. I argue that, given a set of 
“axiomatic truths”, it is our Rules of Inference that determine “formal (logical) truth” 
values in any interpretation.  
Model: Thus I argue (Anand 2001, Section_4) that an interpretation can be a model of 
two formal systems that have identical primitive symbols, identical rules of construction 
for well-formed formulas, and identical sets of “axiomatic truths”, but distinctly different, 
contradictory, “logical” consequences. 
Communication: My thesis is that it is through our system of formal languages that we, 
on the one hand, constructively assign “formal (logical) truths” (and provability) and, on 
the other, non-constructively assign selected characteristics of non-verifiable “inductive 
(extra-logical) truths” (through qualified generalisation), to elements of the language in 
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an effort to correspond these to specific “factual (intuitive) truths” of our intuitively 
constructed individual perceptions whose “significance” we desire to communicate. 
Uniqueness: I suggest that there can be no commonly verifiable non-standard model. 
Each such must differ in some essentials perceived uniquely only by each perceiver who 
is, in effect, both the architect and builder of the model. 
Bhupinder Singh Anand     Friday, 15 February 2002 
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Paradox regained: Life beyond Gödel’s 
shadow 
1. Introduction 
1.1. An intellectual challenge for the 21st century: Gödel in a wider perspective 
One of the intellectual challenges inherited from the last century is that of interpreting 
Gödel’s assertions of formal undecidability within a wider, intuitively acceptable, 
perspective. Given his formal premises, Gödel’s formal reasoning and its formal 
consequences (Gödel 1931) are logically irrefutable. However, there is no similarly 
unequivocal interpretation of his reasoning, or of his conclusions. 
I argue elsewhere (Anand 2001), in greater detail, the thesis that differing perceptions of 
the interpretation of Gödel’s reasoning and conclusions arise because the system of 
standard Peano’s Arithmetic, essentially formulated by Gödel (1931, pp.9), is only one - 
and perhaps not the most representative - of several significantly differing systems that 
can be defined to formalise our system of Intuitive Arithmetic IA of the natural 
“counting” numbers (which we take to be the Arithmetic based on an intuitive 
interpretation of Dedekind’s formulation of Peano’s Postulates1). 
(Another thesis would be that Gödel’s formal system itself is open to significantly 
differing interpretations.) 
                                               
1 These can be formulated (Mendelson 1964) as follows: 
 
(P1)   0 is a natural number 
(P2)   If x is a natural number, there is another natural number, denoted by x' (called the successor of x). 
(P3)   0 is not equal to x' for any natural number x. 
(P4)   If x' = y', then x = y. 
(P5)   If Q is a property which may or may not hold of natural numbers, and if (I) 0 has the property Q, and 
(II) whenever a natural number x has the property Q, then x' has the property Q, then all natural numbers 
have the property Q (Principle of Induction). 
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In this paper I outline in more general terms a constructive, and intuitionistically 
unobjectionable, formalisation PP of IA in which the Axioms and Rules of Inference are 
recursively definable. I argue that, although Gödel’s undecidable sentence GUS is a well-
formed formula in PP, it is an ill-defined formal proposition2 that formally reflects the 
“Liar” paradox in PP. 
1.2. Gödel’s Undecidability Theorem and its consequences 
Usually referred to loosely as “Gödel's Theorems", these assertions are the outcome of 
Gödel's attempt to construct a formal language for faithfully expressing our Intuitive 
Arithmetic IA of the natural numbers.  
The ideal source for assessing Gödel’s intent and the significance of the wealth of 
concepts introduced by him in the course of his attempt is still, albeit arguably, his 
seminal paper “On formally undecidable propositions of Principia Mathematica and 
related systems I”, accessible on the web in an English translation by B. Meltzer (Gödel 
1931).  
However, with the advantage of hindsight, my thesis in this paper is that the essence of 
Gödel’s reasoning, its formal consequences, and its wider implications, are better viewed 
today in a somewhat different context. 
1.3. The "Liar" paradox 
Around 2000 years back, Greek philosophers discussed the paradox of ambiguous self-
reference within ordinary language. This arises if we postulate a ‘Liar’ expression, which 
reads as "The ‘Liar’ proposition is a lie", as a valid proposition within the language in 
                                               
 
2 We define a “proposition”, or a “sentence”, as a well-formed formula of a formal system that contains no 
free variables. 
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which the expression is constructed. Clearly, the "Liar" proposition is true if and only if it 
is a lie! 
Now the grammar of an ordinary language governs the construction of words and 
propositions of the language for use as a means of general unrestricted communication. It 
obviously does not contain the specification necessary to prohibit the creation by 
definition of such vague, or ill-defined, self-referential expressions as that of the “Liar”. 
Though these may have the formal form of propositions, they appear devoid of the 
“communicative content”, or “meaning”, that we intuitively expect propositions to have.  
We conclude that the well-defined "Liar" expression cannot be a well-defined "Liar" 
proposition in a “consistent” language. So we may either treat the language as inherently 
“inconsistent”, or conclude that the language is deficient in its ability to identify well-
defined expressions that are ill-defined, or “meaningless”, propositions. 
Considered primarily a linguistic anomaly, the paradox does, however, focus attention on 
the issue:  
When may we treat a well-formed expression as a well-defined proposition, without 
fear of contradiction? 
1.4. The Russell paradox 
The “Liar” paradox gained in significance when, in 1901, Bertrand Russell discovered a 
similarly paradoxical expression within Set Theory. Loosely speaking, he defined a set, 
which we may name "Russell", as the set whose elements are all, and only, those sets of 
the Theory that do not belong to themselves. Clearly, if it can be expressed within the 
Theory, then the set "Russell" belongs to itself if and only if it does not belong to itself!  
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Again, the Axioms and logical Rules of Inference of the Theory - which governed the 
construction of sets for use in a more restricted and precise language of mathematical 
communication - did not contain the specification necessary to satisfactorily prohibit the 
creation by definition of vague, ill-defined, or inconsistent entities such as the “Russell” 
set that could be expressed within the language of the Theory, but apparently harboured 
concealed concepts involving unruly infinite sets.  
Here too, we conclude from the contradiction that introduction of the well-defined 
"Russell" expression cannot yield a well-defined "Russell" set in a consistent Set Theory. 
So, again, we may either treat any Theory admitting such sets as inherently inconsistent, 
or conclude that such a Theory is deficient in its ability to identify well-defined 
expressions that yield ill-defined "sets". 
Viewed as a reflection on the soundness of the foundations of mathematics, Russell's 
paradox focuses on the issue:  
When may we introduce entities through definition into our mathematical languages, 
without fear of contradiction?  
1.5. Creation through definition 
We note that definitions are essentially arbitrary assignments of convenient names within 
a language, or theory, for expressing complex reasoning in a compact and easier-to-grasp 
form. 
The paradoxes indicate that unrestricted definitions, particularly those that involve self-
reference, may admit well-formed expressions within the language, or theory, which lead 
to an inconsistency. Clearly such expressions must be considered as ill-defined elements 
within the language, or theory. It follows that a language, or theory, that admits such 
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well-formed expressions as representing well-defined elements cannot uncritically be 
assumed consistent. 
2. Formal systems 
2.1. Intuitive Arithmetic IA and the formal system PP 
A natural question arises whether the simplest, and most intuitive, of our mathematical 
theories also admit such expressions. We consider, for instance, the Intuitive Arithmetic 
IA of the natural “counting” numbers. The following Axioms - based on what are termed 
as Peano's Postulates, and expressed formally in a sub-language PP of IA as defined 
below - are commonly taken to be “formally true” representations of some of the most 
“intuitively true” assertions of IA3: 
(By “PP”, we shall henceforth mean “the sub-language PP of IA”.) 
(PP1)     (Ax)|=PP ~(0 = (x+1)) 
(Intuitive interpretation: Adding 1 to any natural number expressible in PP 
never yields 0.) 
                                               
 
3 However, we note that, in the usual formalisations of Peano Arithmetics, such as PP, the axioms do not 
completely reflect Dedekind’s intentions as formulated in his Peano Postulates. Thus there are no axioms 
corresponding to the postulates (P1) and (P2) detailed in footnote (1). These essentially assert that the 
domain of the system, over which the variables of the system range, necessarily consists of only the natural 
numbers. A corresponding axiom in a formalisation would assert that “(Ax)(‘x is a numeral’)”. In PP, such 
an assertion could be expressed as “(Ax)((x = 0) v (E!y)(E!z)((x = (y+1)) & (z = (x+1))))”.  
 
It can reasonably be argued that it is the omission of this restricting axiom that leads to the questionable - 
and controversial - admission of non-constructive elements, and of non-standard interpretations, into what 
are intended essentially to be constructive and intuitionistically unobjectionable formalisations of our 
Intuitive Arithmetic of the natural “counting” numbers, as expressed by Dedekind in his Peano Postulates. 
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(PP2)     (Ax)(Ay)|=PP ~(x=y) => ~((x+1) = (y+1)) 
(Intuitive interpretation: Adding 1 to each of two different natural numbers 
expressible in PP yields two different natural numbers that are expressible 
in PP.) 
(PP3)     (Ax)|=PP (x+0) = x 
(Intuitive interpretation: Adding 0 to a natural number that is expressible in 
PP yields the same natural number.) 
(PP4)     (Ax)(Ay)|=PP (x+(y+1)) = ((x+y)+1) 
(Intuitive interpretation: Adding 1 to a natural number that is expressible in 
PP, and then adding another natural number that is expressible in PP to the 
sum, yields the same natural number that is expressible in PP as is obtained 
by adding the two natural number that are expressible in PP first, and then 
adding 1 to their sum; in other words addition is an “associative” operation 
over the natural numbers expressible in PP.) 
(PP5)     (Ax)|=PP (x*0) = 0 
(Intuitive interpretation: Multiplying a natural number expressible in PP by 
0 yields 0.) 
(PP6)     (Ax)(Ay)|=PP (x*(y+1)) = ((x*y)+x) 
(Intuitive interpretation: Adding 1 to a natural number that is expressible in 
PP, and then multiplying the sum by a second natural number that is 
expressible in PP, yields the same natural number that is expressible in PP 
as is obtained by multiplying the two natural number that are expressible in 
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PP first, and then adding the second natural number that is expressible in 
PP to their product; in other words multiplication is a “distributive” 
operation over “addition” for the natural numbers expressible in PP.) 
2.2. The alphabet S of the sub-language PP of IA 
The characteristic feature of these selected “assertions”, which are taken to express the 
most intuitive arithmetical truths of IA symbolically, is that they are expressed using only 
a limited alphabet S, containing the arithmetical symbols “+” (addition) and “*” 
(multiplication) only, apart from the meta-logical and logical symbols “|=PP” (It is 
“formally true” in PP that), “~”(not), “=>” (implies), “=” (equals), “&” (and), “v” (or), 
“(Ax)” (for all x), “(Ex)” (there exists x), “x, y, ...” (variables), “a, b, c, ...” (constants), 
“0” (zero), “1” (one), and the two parentheses “(“, “)”.  
2.3. The domains of IA and PP 
The (ontological) domain over which the finite set of variables “x, y, ...” range is taken, 
in IA, to be the intuitively non-terminating series “0, 1, 2, 3, ...” of natural “counting” 
numbers and, in PP, the non-terminating formal series expressing the natural numbers in 
PP as the numerals “0, 0+1, (0+1)+1, ((0+1)+1)+1, ...”. 
2.4. Quantification and “formal truth” in PP : nailing an ambiguity 
Thus each of (PP1) to (PP6) symbolically assigns a “formal (logical) truth” value in PP 
to a countable infinity of arithmetical “propositions” of IA. In other words, assuming the 
expression, including the meta-logical symbol “|=PP”, is a well-formed “propositional 
formula” by the rules for the formation of well-formed “propositional formulas” of PP, 
the well-formed formula to the right of the meta-logical symbol “|=PP” is asserted as a 
“formally true” proposition in PP for any given set of finite values of the variables 
contained in it.  
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Clearly, a crucial characteristic of the language PP, as defined above, is that all formulas 
containing quantifiers necessarily contain the “formally true” meta-logical symbol “|=PP” 
immediately after the quantifier. This reflects the intention that, in PP, the quantifiers 
“(Ax)” and “(Ex)” should indeed “quantify” the “formal truth” of the expression “F(x)” 
over a specific domain in order to yield a well-defined expression that has the symbolic 
form of a “proposition”. Thus all formal propositions of PP that contain quantifiers are 
meta-assertions under interpretation. 
I argue further that “(Ax)|=PP F(x)” is intended to formally represent the intuitive meta-
assertion that “F(x) is ‘formally true’ in PP for all values of x that are expressible in PP”. 
I therefore adopt the expanded form to highlight the significance of the intended meta-
assertion (or negation) of the compound “formal truth”, involved in “(Ax)|=PP F(x)”, 
when we intend to adjoin “(Ax)” to “F(x)” in PP. 
2.5. Rules of inference in PP 
The two Rules of Inference in PP, for deriving propositions in PP that are “logical” 
consequences of the above Postulates, are Modus Ponens and Induction. 
(PPR1)      Modus Ponens: From “(Ax)|=PP F(x)” and “(Ax)|=PP (F(x) => G(x))” we 
may conclude “(Ax)|=PP G(x)”. 
(Intuitive interpretation: If F(x) is “formally true” for all natural numbers x expressible 
in PP, and G(x) is “formally true” whenever F(x) is “formally true” for any natural 
number x expressible in PP, then G(x) is “formally true” for all natural numbers x 
expressible in PP.) 
(PPR2)      Induction: From “|=PP F(0)” and “(Ax)|=PP (F(x) => F(x+1))” we may 
conclude “(Ax)|=PP F(x)”. 
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(Intuitive interpretation: If F(0) is “formally true”, and F(x+1) is “formally true” 
whenever F(x) is “formally true” for any natural number x expressible in PP, then F(x) 
is “formally true” for all natural numbers x expressible in PP.) 
3. Gödel’s reasoning 
3.1. Is there a “Liar” expression in IA? 
Around 1930, Gödel considered whether the “Liar” expression, "The ‘Liar’ proposition is 
a lie", would be “reflected” formally in PP by asserting an arithmetical “Gödel” 
proposition that is “equivalent”, loosely speaking, to the assertion “The ‘Gödel’ 
proposition is not ‘provable’”.  
What Gödel had noticed, with remarkable insight, was that terms such as “well-formed 
formula”4, “well-formed proposition” and “proof sequence” could be formally defined in 
the language of PP. He therefore argued that he could express meta-assertions about PP 
such as “ ‘F(x)’ is a well-formed formula in PP”, “ ‘(Ax)|=PP F(x)’ is a well-formed 
proposition in PP”, “ ‘F(x)’ is a ‘provable’ formula in PP”, “ ‘(Ax)|=PP F(x)’ is a 
‘provable’ proposition in PP” and “The ‘Gödel’ proposition is not ‘provable’ in PP”, 
amongst others, as equivalent arithmetical propositions in PP. 
3.2. Provability in PP 
The essence of Gödel’s argument, when applied to PP, is that we can define a proposition 
P of IA as “PP-provable” if and only if there is a finite “proof sequence” consisting of 
propositions of PP each of which is either a “formally true” axiom (PP1-6), or a 
“formally true” immediate consequence of the preceding “formally true” propositions by 
the Rules of Inference (PPR1-2), and where P is the final proposition in the sequence. 
                                               
 
4 We use the formal term “formula” as corresponding to the intuitive term “expression”. 
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The “PP-provable” propositions are thus characterised by the fact that they are all 
expressed as “well-formed propositions”, such as “(Ax)|=PP F(x)”, using only a small set 
of primitive, undefined symbols of the alphabet S. Clearly, the Axioms (PP1-6) are all 
“PP-provable” propositions. 
3.3. Recursive functions in PP 
The significance of the alphabet S selected for expressing “PP-provable” propositions is 
that many significant arithmetical functions of IA such as “n!” (factorial), “m^n” 
(exponential), “m/n” (division), “n is a prime number”, amongst others, are defined 
recursively5. 
Thus we note that “n!”, for instance, is defined by “0!=1” and “(n+1)!=(n+1)*(n!) for all 
natural numbers n”. If we attempt to eliminate the symbol “!” on the right side in this 
definition, we soon discover that the function is not directly reducible to a form that is 
expressible in only the symbols of the alphabet S.  
Now an obvious way to express “n!” as a function in PP is, of course, to introduce “!” as 
an additional primitive symbol into the alphabet S. However, since we can define 
infinitely many recursive functions that are similarly not expressible directly in S, every 
introduction of a new function by definition through a new “symbol” such as “!” would 
                                               
 
5 Loosely speaking, we assume that, in an Arithmetical system such as IA, a function or relation containing 
“free” variables is “recursive” if and only if, for any given set of values for the “free” variables in the 
definition of the function or relation, the arithmetical value of the function, or the “formal truth/falsity” of 
the relation, can be determined in a finite number of steps from the Axioms of the system using its Rules of 
Inference by some mechanical procedure.   
 
Another assumed characteristic of recursive expressions in an Arithmetical system such as IA is that, for 
any given set of values for the “free” variables in the definition of the expression, it can be reduced, in a 
finite number of steps by some mechanical procedure, to an expression that consists of only a finite number 
of primitive symbols of a suitably constructed sub-language of IA such as PP, even though the definition 
and expression of the function or relation may involve an element of self-reference. 
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require a fresh determination as to whether the enlarged system “ ‘PP’+’!’ ” is capable of 
yielding a logical paradox. 
3.4. A Representation lemma of Hilbert and Bernays 
This issue is addressed by a Representation lemma of Hilbert and Bernays that is based 
on defining a suitable Gödel “Beta-function” for every recursive function f(x) definable 
in IA. By means of this stratagem, we can then establish that every recursive function 
f(x) definable in IA is “equivalent” to some formal arithmetical relation F(x, y) of IA 
that can be expressed in PP, in the sense that, for any natural numbers k, m: 
(i)     If f(k)=m is “formally true” in IA, then “|=PP F(k, m)”6 is “PP-provable”, whilst 
(ii)     If f(k)=m is “formally false” in IA, then “|=PP ~F(k, m)” is “PP-provable”. 
3.5. Are recursive functions “consistent”? 
The question of whether “new” recursive functions are “consistent”7, in other words 
whether they can introduce into IA self-contradicting expressions similar to the “Liar” 
expression, is thus reduced, in a sense, to the question of whether the well-formed 
formulas of IA that are “PP-provable” are “consistent”. 
This was among the various specific issues that Gödel addressed, albeit in a slightly 
different language PA (known as standard Peano’s Arithmetic), which was essentially 
intended to reflect the intuitively true propositions of IA most faithfully. However, before 
considering the details of Gödel’s reasoning in standard PA, we take advantage of 
hindsight to consider his reasoning in the system PP. 
                                               
 
6 We denote by “n” the formal “numeral” corresponding to the intuitive natural number “n”. 
 
7 Loosely speaking, we assume that a system is “consistent” if there is no proposition “F” such that both 
“F” and “~F” are “formally true” in the system. 
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3.6. Gödel-numbering 
A key concept underlying Gödel’s reasoning arises from the rather ordinary fact that 
every expression ‘F’ constructed by concatenation from the primitive, undefined symbols 
of S can be assigned a unique natural number, which we term as the "Gödel" number of 
the expression ‘F’. Gödel's extraordinary achievement was to recognise that this fact 
could be used to reflect various meta-mathematical statements about PP as arithmetical 
propositions within PP (Gödel 1931, pp.13). 
For instance, Gödel constructively established (Gödel 1931, pp.17-22) that we can define 
a recursive prf(x, y) in IA (Gödel’s ‘yBx’), constructed out of 44 “simpler” recursive, 
such that, for any natural numbers k and m, prf(k, m) is “formally true” if and only if k is 
the Gödel-number of a finite proof sequence K in PP for some well-formed proposition 
M in PP whose Gödel-number is m. 
(This is generally expressed as the assertion that the Axioms and Rules of Inference of PP 
are recursively definable or recursively enumerable.) 
3.7. Gödel’s Self-reference Lemma 
From the recursive prf(x, y), he could then define another recursive q(x, y) in IA which is 
“formally true” if and only if x is the Gödel-number of a well-formed formula H(z) of PP 
with a single free variable z, and y is the Gödel-number of a proof of H(x) in PP. 
Hence the constructive self-reference, which lies at the core of Gödel's reasoning, is that, 
given any natural numbers k, m: 
q(h. j) is “formally true” in IA <=> The formula J in PP, whose Gödel number is j, is 
a proof sequence in PP of the well-formed 
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proposition H(h) of PP, where h is the Gödel-
number of the formula H(z) in PP. 
3.8. Hilbert & Bernays Representation Lemma 
Now, by Hilbert and Bernays Representation lemma, q(x, y) is constructively equivalent 
in IA to a  unique well-formed formula Q(x, y) of PP, expressible in S, such that for 
every pair of natural numbers k, m: 
(i)     q(k, m) is “formally true” in IA => “|=PP Q(k, m)” is “PP-provable”  
(ii)     q(k, m) is “formally false” in IA => “|=PP ~Q(k, m)” is “PP-provable”  
3.9. The undecidable “Gödel” proposition in PP 
If p is the Gödel-number of the well-formed formula “(Ay)|=PP (~Q(x, y))”, we consider 
then the well-formed “Gödel” proposition GUS expressed by “(Ay)|=PP (~Q(p, y))”. 
(a)  We assume firstly that r is the Gödel-number of some proof-sequence R in PP for 
the proposition “(Ay)|=PP (~Q(p, y))”. By Gödel’s Self-reference lemma, q(p, r) is 
“formally true” in IA. Also, by the Representation Lemma, this implies that “|=PP 
Q(p, r)” is “PP-provable”. However, assuming standard logical axioms for PP, 
from the “PP-provability” of “(Ay)|=PP (~Q(p, y))” we have that “|=PP ~Q(p, r)” is 
“PP-provable”. It follows that there is no natural number r that is the Gödel-number 
of a proof-sequence R in PP for the proposition “(Ay)|=PP (~Q(p, y))”. Hence 
“(Ay)|=PP (~Q(p, y))” is not “PP-provable”. 
(b)  We assume next that r is the Gödel-number of some proof-sequence R in PP for the 
proposition “~(Ay)|=PP (~Q(p, y))”. It then follows that “(Ey)|=PP Q(p, y)” is “PP-
provable”. Hence, assuming standard logical axioms for PP, “|=PP Q(p, r)” is “PP-
provable” for some natural number r. However, we have by (a) that q(p, r) is 
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“formally false” in IA for all r, and so “|=PP ~Q(p, r)” is “PP-provable” for all r. 
The contradiction establishes that “~(Ay)|=PP (~Q(p, y))” is not “PP-provable”.  
(c)  We conclude that the “PP-provability” of the proposition “(Ay)|=PP (~Q(p, y))” is 
“undecidable”, since neither “(Ay)|=PP (~Q(p, y))” nor “~(Ay)|=PP (~Q(p, y))” is 
“PP-provable”. 
4. Beyond Gödel 
4.1. “Formal truth” and “L-provability” as formally assigned values 
Now, as noted in §2.4, given a well-constructed language L that expresses relations 
between the various terms of an ontology, one way of viewing Axioms and Rules of 
Inference is as the means by which we formally assign properties such as  “formal truth” 
and “L-provability” to the various formulas of the language that are defined as well-
formed propositions. 
As adopted in this paper, this view is, in essence, a non-Platonistic approach to the 
concept of “intuitive truth”. It explicitly holds “formal truth”, or “logical truth”, to be an 
assignment of values to specified formulas of IA, where the assignment, if intuitive, is 
necessarily axiomatic and, if formal, follows from the Axioms by the Rules of Inference in 
a constructive and intuitionistically unobjectionable manner. 
4.2. Effectiveness of a language 
A natural question, then, is whether a given set of Axioms and Rules of Inference of a 
language L suffice to unequivocally assign a unique “formal truth” value to every 
formula that is a well-formed proposition, a concept that we may define as semantic 
effectiveness.  
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Another question would be whether such Axioms and Rules of Inference of the language 
further suffice to constructively determine whether every well-formed proposition that is 
“formally true” is “L-provable”, which we may define as syntactic effectiveness. 
The “Liar” sentence and the “Russell” set establish that intuitive Axioms and Rules of 
Inference of our ordinary languages of communication and of set theory - whether 
implicit or explicit - do not suffice to ensure “semantic effectiveness” for these languages. 
The “Gödel” proposition GUS establishes that the above part of our Intuitive Arithmetic 
IA of the natural numbers, which is formalised by the Axioms (PP1-6) and the Rules of 
Inference (PPR1-2), is not “syntactically effective”. 
4.3. Collapse of the “Gödelian” argument 
Now, by §3.9(a), we have that “|=PP ~Q(p, r)” is “PP-provable” for all r. We thus have 
that “~Q(p, y)” is “formally true” in IA for all y, since the domain of IA is expressible in 
PP, and every “PP-provable” proposition is, by definition, “formally true” in IA. It now 
follows by our intuitive definition of quantification in IA, that “(Ay)(~Q(p, y))” is 
assertable as a “formally true” proposition in IA. (since the domain of IA is expressible in 
PP), whence it follows that “(Ay)|=PP (~Q(p, y))” is a “formally true” proposition in IA.  
We thus have that, though “(Ay)|=PP (~Q(p, y))” is not “PP-provable”, we yet have 
“(Ay)|=PP (~Q(p, y))” established as a “formally true” proposition in IA by the Axioms 
(PP1-6) and Rules of Inference (PPR1-2) of PP. However, the “formal truth” of the 
assertion in IA is clearly of a “definitional” nature, and a formal consequence of the 
Axioms and Rules of Inference of PP. 
We note that this is a curious “formal” feature of “Gödelian” propositions in PP, which 
essentially demolishes the Gödelian argument (see also Anand 2001, §1.13). As offered 
by J.R.Lucas, Roger Penrose and others, this argument is the thesis that there is some 
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non-mechanistic element - knowledge of which is Platonistically available to human 
intelligence but cannot be reflected in any machine intelligence - that is involved in 
establishing that a well-formed formula such as “(Ay)|=PP (~Q(p, y))” is not “PP-
provable”, yet translates into a “formally true” proposition under interpretation in IA, 
which is defined as the “standard” model of PP. 
4.4. Constructive “PP-provability” 
Now it seems natural to consider whether we can augment either the Axioms (PP1-6) or 
the Rules of Inference (PPR1-2) so that we can assign a “PP-provability” value to 
“(Ay)|=PP (~Q(p, y))”, and thereby obtain a larger set of “PP-provable” propositions of 
IA.  
In the light of the above reasoning, a naturally obvious way to achieve this would be to 
introduce as a Rule of Inference: 
(PPR3)    Constructive PP-provability: From “(Ax)[|=PP ‘x is a numeral’ => |=PP 
F(x)]” we may conclude “(Ax)|=PP F(x)”. 
(We note that (PPR3) is recursively definable in PP since “x is a numeral” is recursively 
definable in PP by “(x=0) v (E!y)(E!z)((x = (y+1)) & (z = (x+1)))”, where "E!" 
denotes uniqueness of the existential assertion. We also note that, in a more formal 
exposition, we would distinguish between “PP” and “PP+PPR3”.) 
4.5. Paradox regained : “Constructive PP-provability” and “Gödelian” propositions 
We now have, by §3.9 (a), that q(p, r) is “formally false” in IA for all r, and so “|=PP 
~Q(p, r)” is “PP-provable” for all r. It then follows from (PPR3) that “(Ay)|=PP (~Q(p, 
y))” is “PP-provable”, and so no longer undecidable. 
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We thus have that: 
(i)     “(Ay)|=PP (~Q(p, y))” is “PP-provable” => “(Ay)|=PP (~Q(p, y))” is not “PP-
provable”, and 
(ii)    “(Ay)|=PP (~Q(p, y))” is not “PP-provable” => “(Ay)|=PP (~Q(p, y))” is “PP-
provable”. 
So we have succeeded in establishing the “Gödelian” proposition “(Ay)|=PP (~Q(p, y))” 
as reflecting the “Liar” sentence in a formal sub-language of IA that has a Constructive 
Provability Rule of Inference. We conclude that the well-formed “Gödelian” proposition 
“(Ay)|=PP(~Q(p, y))” is essentially an ill-defined proposition in such a system. 
We note that the above reasoning remains logically valid even if we eliminate “|=PP” as a 
primitive symbol in PP. However, this would again obscure my thesis that 
“quantification” essentially assigns “formal truth” values to the set of propositions of IA 
that are determined by the Axioms (PP1-6) and Rules of Inference (PPR1-2) of PP. 
4.6. Beyond Gödel’s shadow 
We are now faced with the question of whether to accept the Constructive PP-provability 
Rule of Inference as intuitively natural to our Intuitive Arithmetic IA or not. In the first 
case, we are faced with the dilemma of a well-formed, but ill-defined, proposition in IA. 
In the second, we are faced with the dilemma of accepting a system of Intuitive 
Arithmetic IA, but rejecting its inconvenient intuitive elements. 
This point assumes significance when we see how Gödel addressed this issue in the sub-
language PA of IA. 
(By “PA”, we shall henceforth mean “the sub-language PA of IA”.) 
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If the above argument, establishing the existence of Gödel’s undecidable proposition 
GUS as a well-formed, but ill-defined, proposition in constructive and intuitionistically 
unobjectionable formalisations of Peano’s Postulates such as PP, is substantive, then the 
question arises: 
What feature of Gödel’s formalisation of Peano’s Postulates permits him to conclude 
the existence of GUS as both a well-formed formula and as a well-defined formal 
proposition in standard PA? 
5. Basis of Gödel’s conclusions 
5.1. Intuitive Arithmetic IA and Peano’s Arithmetic PA 
We start by noting that, in standard (first order) Peano’s Arithmetic PA (Mendelson 
1964, pp. 102), which is essentially the system considered by Gödel (1931), the Axioms 
and Rules of Inference assign “PA-provability” values to selected well-formed formulas 
of IA. The standard Axioms of PA are: 
(GP1)     |-PA ~(0 = (x+1)) 
(GP2)     |-PA ~(x = y) => ~((x+1) = (y+1)) 
(GP3)     |-PA (x+0) = x 
(GP4)     |-PA (x+(y+1)) = ((x+y)+1) 
(GP5)     |-PA (x*0) = 0 
(GP6)     |-PA (x*(y+1)) = ((x*y)+x) 
The genesis of the Axioms (GP1-6) can clearly be seen to lie in (PP1-6); the formulas are 
again expressed using only a small set of undefined, primitive, symbols such as “+” 
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(addition) and “*” (multiplication) only apart from the meta-logical and logical symbols 
“|-PA” (It is provable in PA that), “~”(not), “=>” (implies), “=” (equals), “&” (and), “v” 
(or), “(Ax)” (for all x), “(Ex)” (there exists x), “x, y, ...” (variables), “a, b, c, ...” 
(constants), “0” (zero), “1” (one), and the two parentheses “(“, “)”.  
The non-terminating series of numerals “0, 0+1, (0+1)+1, ((0+1)+1)+1, ...” is again taken 
as formally representing in PA the various, intuitively non-terminating, natural 
“counting” number series such as “0, 1, 10, 11, ...” (in binary format), or “0, 1, 2, 3, ...” 
(in the more common decimal format). 
5.2. Rules of inference in PA 
Gödel’s Rules of Inference in PA, for deriving other “PA-provable” formulas from the 
Axioms (GP1-6), are Modus Ponens, Induction and Generalisation. 
Like the Axioms of PA, the first two clearly reflect their roots in (PPR1-2). 
(GPR1) Modus ponens: From “|-PA F” and “|-PA (F => G)” we may conclude 
“|-PA G”, where F and G are any well-defined formulas of PA. 
(GPR2) Induction: From “|-PA F(0)” and “|-PA (Ax)(F(x) => F(x+1))” we may 
conclude “|-PA (Ax)F(x)”. 
5.3. Provability in PA 
Now we note that, since the domain8 of the variables is not specified in PA, each of 
(GP1) to (GP6) formally represents an “indeterminate” set of “PA-provable” arithmetical 
formulas of IA, where: 
                                               
 
8 Compare §2.3. 
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(a)  the expression to the right of the meta-logical symbol “|-PA” is a well-defined 
“formula” of PA, formed from the alphabet S, that does not contain the meta-logical 
symbol “|-PA”; in other words it is a validly defined formula consisting only of a 
finite number of the primitive logical and arithmetical symbols of S, and 
constructed by some well-defined rules of construction of PA. 
(b)  a “formula” is defined “PA-provable” if and only if there is a finite sequence of 
formulas of PA each of which is either an Axiom of PA or an immediate 
consequence of the preceding formulas by the Rules of Inference of PA. 
5.4. Significant features of PP and PA 
We note that an underlying thesis of this paper is that PP and PA are both sub-languages 
of our Intuitive Arithmetic IA that attempt to formally express our “intuitively true” 
assertions of IA as “formally true”, “PP-provable” and “PA-provable” propositions in 
“platform-independent”9 languages of communication. As also noted earlier, the 
semantical and syntactical “effectiveness” of a sub-language may be taken as a measure 
of its expressive strength. 
We now note some significant features that differentiate PP from PA in this respect: 
(a)  PP explicitly assigns both “formal truth” values and formal “PP-provability” values 
to formulas of IA that are built entirely from the finite set of undefined primitive 
meta-logical, logical and arithmetical symbols of PP, provided these are well-
formed simple or “compound” propositions as defined by the rules for proposition 
formation in PP. We note that since, as determined in §4.5, there are ill-defined 
Gödelian sentences that are “PP-provable”, but cannot be assigned any “formal 
                                               
 
9 We consider any assignment of “formal truth” and “provability” values as “platform-independent” if the 
determination of such values can be arrived at by some mechanical procedure that is constructive and 
intuitionistically unobjectionable. 
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truth” value, the “PP-provable” formulas of IA are not a proper subset of the 
“formally true” formulas of IA. 
(b)  PA, as defined so far, assigns only “PA-provability” values to formulas built 
entirely from the finite set of undefined primitive symbols of PA, provided these 
are well-formed formulas as defined by the rules for formation of formulas of PA. 
(c)  Since “PA-provability” of a formula does not require that it have the form of a 
“proposition”, there are “PA-provable” formulas that are not “propositions”. It 
follows that there are “PA-provable” formulas that cannot be assigned any “formal 
truth” values in IA (and, ipso facto, in PP) under interpretation, and so the “PA-
provable” formulas too are not a proper sub-set of the “formally true” formulas of 
IA (and, ipso facto, of PP).  
(d) The issue then is to see: 
(i)  whether every “PA-provable” formula that has the form of a “proposition” 
can be assigned a unique “formal truth” value in IA (and, ipso facto, in PP) 
under interpretation and, if so, 
(ii) whether we can provide an intuitionistically unobjectionable rule for inferring 
from a “PA-provable” formula that does not have the form of a “proposition” 
some “PA-provable” formula that does, so that the latter can be assigned a 
unique “formal truth” value in IA (and, ipso facto, in PP).  
(e)  The particular Rule of Inference selected by Gödel to achieve this last is termed as 
Generalisation. It is undisputedly accepted today as a critical element of the system 
of standard PA.  
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5.5. Generalisation: Gödel’s rule of “Extrapolation” 
In its usual form, Generalisation is expressed as: 
(GPR3) Generalisation: From “|-PA F(x)” we may conclude “|-PA (Ax)F(x)”. 
However, I argue that Gödel’s Generalisation Rule of Inference is essentially a non-
constructive rule of “extrapolation”. It is a crucial introduction of a concept that does not 
draw upon our intuition for its legitimacy. From the verifiable “PA-provability” of 
formulas that are not propositions, it asserts by extrapolation the “formal (logical) truth” 
of propositions under some interpretation which may not be constructively verifiable. In 
other words, it extends the boundaries of what is intuitively familiar into the area of what 
appears familiar, but is in effect unverifiable, by a “logical” extrapolation.  
I argue that the non-constructive and Platonistic nature of Generalisation becomes 
apparent if we recast the above as: 
(GPR4) Generalisation*: From “|-PA F(x)” we may conclude “|-PA ((Ax)|=M 
F(x))”. 
Now what Generalisation* essentially asserts is that from the formal “PA-provability” of 
the formula “F(x)”, we may conclude that “F(x)” is “formally (logically) true” for all 
values of x in any “interpretation”10 M of PA. Generalisation* is thus the means of 
assigning “formal (logical) truth” values to selected formulas of PA not only in IA (and, 
ipso facto, in PP, the formal sub-language of IA that formalises the concept of “intuitive 
truth” in IA), but in any interpretation M of PA. 
                                               
 
10 Loosely speaking, an “interpretation” M of a formal system such as PA is a 1-1 mapping of the 
undefined symbols of PA into the symbols of M under which each predicate symbol of PA corresponds to 
a “similar” relation of M, each function symbol of PA corresponds to a “similar” function in M, and each 
constant symbol of PA corresponds to some fixed element of M (Mendelson 1964, pp. 49). 
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Before we consider the wider implications of a Rule of Inference such as Generalisation, 
we briefly review Gödel’s argument for establishing an undecidable proposition in PA. 
5.6. Gödel's undecidable proposition GUS 
As detailed in §3.9, if p is the Gödel-number of the formula “(Ay)(~Q(x, y))”, then GUS 
is the proposition “(Ay)(~Q(p, y))”. 
Clearly, GUS is a well-constructed arithmetical formula, which is uniquely identified by 
a well-constructed natural number g (its Gödel-number).  
Gödel's argument (essentially along the lines outlined in §3.6 –3.9) is then that if r is the 
Gödel-number of some proof-sequence R in PA of the formula “(Ay)(~Q(p, y))”, this 
can constructively be shown to imply the “formal truth”, in IA (and, ipso facto, in PP), of 
another arithmetical formula “q(p, r)” of IA which, in turn, can constructively be shown 
equivalent to the following assertion G that can also be expressed as a formula in IA: 
(G) "A proof for the sentence whose Gödel number is p cannot be written out in a 
finite number of steps from the Axioms (GP1-6), using only the Rules of 
Inference (GPR1-3)". 
 Assuming PA is consistent, Gödel could then conclude: 
(1)  GUS is “PA-provable” => “q(p, r)” is “formally true” in IA => G is “formally 
true” in IA => GUS is not “PA-provable”,  
Hence GUS is not “PA-provable”; 
(2) ~GUS is “PA-provable” => GUS is “PA-provable” 
Hence ~GUS is not “PA-provable”. 
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5.7. The roots of GUS 
Now the involved (but, contrary to appearances, not critical) part of Gödel's reasoning is 
that “q(p, r)” is the instantiation of an intuitive primitive recursive arithmetic relation 
“q(p, y)” where p is the Gödel-number of the formula “(Ay)(~Q(x, y))”. 
Also, GUS is the formula “(Ay)(~Q(p, y))” where we have, by the application of the 
Representation Lemma §3.8 to PA, that, for all natural numbers r: 
(i)     “q(p, r)” is “formally true” in IA => “Q(p, r)” is “PA-provable”, and  
 (ii)     “q(p, r)” is “formally false” in IA => “~Q(p, r)” is “PA-provable”. 
As in the "Liar" and "Russell" cases, both the formulas “q(p, y)” and “Q(p, y)” are well-
formed formulas within IA and PA respectively. Hence the other formulas such as 
“(Ay)(~Q(p, y))”, or GUS, and “q(p, r)” are also well-formed formulas. 
5.8. Well-formed, well-defined formulas of Gödel's formal system of standard PA 
Although this is not immediately obvious, Gödel's entire chain of reasoning, which 
establishes GUS as undecidable, critically rests on proving firstly that the well-formed 
formula “(Ay)(~Q(p, y))” is also a well-defined proposition in PA, and secondly that it 
translates as a well-defined proposition in IA, which is taken to be the standard 
interpretation of standard PA.  
Classically, the well-definedness of “(Ay)(~Q(p, y))” is established by showing that 
“(E!w)Q(x, w)” is a “PA-provable” formula (Mendelson 1964, pp. 134). 
(Here "E!" denotes uniqueness of the existential assertion. The above argument is 
developed in detail in Anand 2001 (§2.8)) 
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6. Questioning Gödel’s conclusions  
6.1. GUS is well-defined in PA, but not necessarily in any interpretation M  
The questionable aspect of Gödel's reasoning and conclusions is that, since “Q(x, y)” is 
well-defined in PA, in any interpretation M of PA, the well-defined formula 
“(Ay)(~Q(p, y))” is a well-defined proposition about an arithmetical relation "Q(x, y)" 
that may, or may not, hold for any, or some, or all values of “x” and “y” in the domain of 
M. It follows that the arithmetical relation "Q(x, y)" is assumed well-defined in every M.  
However, although "Q(k, m)" is equivalent to “q(k, m)” in PA for any given natural 
numbers k, m (where k, m are the numerals that represent the natural numbers k, m in 
PA), the arithmetical relation "Q(x, y)" is not equivalent to “q(x, y)” in IA.  
This follows from the fact that whereas "Q(x, y)" is a well-formed relation in IA that can 
be expressed entirely in terms of the primitive symbols of PA, “q(x, y)” is a recursive 
relation defined in IA that cannot be expressed entirely in terms of the primitive symbols 
of PA. 
6.2. GUS is well-formed and well-defined, but Gödel's reasoning is non-constructive 
Hence the proof that “(E!w)Q(x, w)” is a well-defined formula of PA introduces an 
element into PA, and so into all its interpretations, that is not reflected in the recursive 
arithmetical relation “q(x, y)” of IA that "Q(x, y)", by the Representation Lemma, is 
intended to represent formally in PA. 
This element essentially corresponds to the postulation that the range of values satisfying 
"Q(x, y)", in any interpretation M of PA, can be used to form a well-defined “set” that 
completely characterises the defining property "Q(x, y)".  
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I argue elsewhere (Anand 2001) that the source of such an obviously non-constructive 
postulation is the essential use of the Generalisation Rule of Inference in the proof that 
“(E!w)Q(x, w)” is a “PA-provable” formula. 
This rule permits us to infer that the formula “(Ax)F(x)” is “PA-provable” if we can 
establish that the formula “F(x)” is “PA-provable”. 
Since the Generalisation rule introduces a quantifier (which ranges over an unspecified 
domain) into the formula, I argue that Gödel's proof of the well-definedness of 
“(E!w)Q(x, w)” is non-constructive, even though “(E!w)Q(x, w)” is both a well-
constructed and a well-defined formula in PA.  
6.3. Intuitive Arithmetic IA is not a model of PA 
Since I argue that "Q(x, y)" is not a well-defined "relation" of any well-defined set of 
natural numbers in the above sense, and that the recursive relation “q(x, y)” is not 
"entirely equivalent" to "Q(x, y)" in every interpretation of PA, I therefore conclude that 
Intuitive Arithmetic IA cannot be a model of PA. 
6.4. Generalisation as a Rule of Inference is intuitionistically questionable 
It is in this sense I argue that the Gödel's choice of Generalisation as his preferred Rule of 
Inference makes his formal system itself non-constructively Platonistic. The sweeping 
consequences of Generalisation are clearly not obviously rooted in our intuition, and so 
are intuitionistically questionable. 
I argue that Generalisation essentially asserts that if “F(x)” is “PA-provable”, then 
“(Ax)F(x)” is necessarily “formally true” in every interpretation. However, this 
implicitly assumes that the concept of “intuitive truth” that is native to an interpretation is 
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equivalent to the concept of a “formal truth” in IA that is implicit in the definition of 
“PA-provability” based on Generalisation.  
I argue elsewhere (Anand 2001, §2.11) that this implicit assumption is invalid. Thus we 
can arrive at different assignments of “provability” as a consequence of a definition of 
“omega-Constructive provability” in a formal system of omega-PA where we base the 
latter on a Rule of Inference, such as Omega-constructivity, which is inconsistent with 
Generalisation. 
6.5. A non-constructive interpretation of Generalisation 
I argue further that if we intend “(Ax)F(x)” to interpret as a condensed formula of the 
assertion “(Ax)|=All M F(x)” (in other words of the assertion that “F(x) is ‘formally true’ 
for all x in the domain of every interpretation M”), then Gödel’s Generalisation is 
equivalent to the non-formal assertion: 
If “F(x)” is “PA-provable”, then “ ‘F(x) is ‘formally true’ for all x in the domain of 
every interpretation M of PA” is “PA-provable”. 
If we allow that some interpretation M of standard PA may have a non-countable 
domain, then Generalisation must clearly be viewed as a non-constructive Rule of 
Inference.11  
Formulas of standard PA whose proofs depend on the necessary use of Generalisation 
are thus essentially non-constructive. Their status under interpretation as well-defined 
“formally true” assertions of any such interpretation M must therefore remain in doubt. 
                                               
11 It essentially postulates, by extrapolation, the “formal truth” of a property, for non-constructive elements 
in the domain of every interpretation M of PA, purely on the basis of the logical validity of the property 
over elements that can be formally represented in PA. 
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7. Conclusions 
In this paper I argue that, contrary to Gödel’s assertion, his argument for the existence of 
“formally undecidable but intuitively true propositions” in the formal system of standard 
PA (and other “systems” that are symbolically sufficient to formalise Intuitive Arithmetic 
recursively) is not clearly “constructive and intuitionistically unobjectionable”. 
I argue that the non-constructive element is, in fact, deceptively implicit in the definition 
of every formal system that admits a Rule of Inference such as Gödel’s Generalisation. 
I define a constructive and intuitionistically unobjectionable formal system PP that is 
recursively definable and which represents Intuitive Arithmetic (as symbolised by 
Peano’s Postulates) more faithfully than Gödel’s standard first order PA. 
I argue that in PP (and similarly definable systems), Gödel’s “undecidable” proposition is 
a well-formed but ill-defined formal sentence that yields a formal inconsistency similar to 
that of the “Liar” sentence in ordinary languages. 
I also argue that the introduction of “formal truth” and “provability” values to selected 
propositions of IA through PP leads to the collapse of the Gödelian argument advanced 
by J.R.Lucas, Roger Penrose and others. 
I argue that the wealth of concepts introduced by Gödel has over-shadowed, and masked, 
the essentially non-constructive element underlying his reasoning. 
I argue that the uncritical acceptance of standard first order PA as the most faithful 
formalisation of Intuitive Arithmetic, as expressed by Peano’s Postulates, must, at some 
level of consciousness, be subtly impeding the development of more constructive 
concepts and systems such as PP that may be more appropriate for the unfettered 
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